Ivorian Deja-Vu?

Posted by Jackson On 10:27 PM 1 comments

On Tuesday November 30, Ivorians waited in front of their televisions for the results of a presidential election that they had already waited nearly a decade for. The spokesman of the Independent Electoral Commission (CEI), Bamba Yacouba appeared in front of the cameras, microphones and assorted journalists with the provisional election results. Before he could read them, he was stopped by two Gbagbo supporters. One of the men, Damana Adia Pickass, Gbagbo’s representative in the CEI, grabbed the results, engaging in a brief tug of war with Yacouba. The latter maintained control, but as he spread the crumpled papers out on the desk to read them Adia Pickass grabbed them once again and tore them up as he stormed off (BBC).
Since then the doors to the CEI offices have remained closed, behind barbed wire topped-walls and armed guards (rfi). Wednesday and it’s midnight deadline for the publication of the results passed without word from the commission (New York Times).

Unfortunately many Ivorians will recognize Tuesday’s proceedings, and so should Gbagbo. During the last Presidential elections in October 2000, head of state General Robert Guei dissolved the electoral commission in order to prevent the release of results which showed that his opponent, Laurent Gbagbo, was in the lead. Gbagbo called on his well organized supporters to take to the streets, and they pushed Guei into exile.


It seems that Gagbo may have learned from the 2000 election and Gen. Guei’s ham-fisted tactics. Instead of resorting to such plainly undemocratic means, Gbagbo clearly has a more legalistic plan. Gbagbo supporters have been alleging fraud since the vote, and Gbagbo spokesman Pascal Affi N’Guessan on Wednesday called for the annulment of the vote in the several northern regions (france 24) because of massive fraud that had relegated the election to a “masquarade”. Damana Adia Pickass later explained that a consensus within the CEI could not be reached over the validity of the results in the north, and without a consensus, no results can be made public or finalized (Jeune Afrique). According to the electoral code if the CEI does not meet the Wednesday night deadline to announce the results, that job is handed over to the Constitutional Council, an institution close to the Gbagbo. The Council is headed by Paul Yao N'dre, a close confidant of Gbagbo's from the early days of their Front Populaire Ivorienne party (Jeune Afrique, ICG). By tying up the CEI Gbagbo is attempting to move the decision from the hands of a more independent body (the CEI) to one loyal to him.

International observers have undercut the basis for Gbagbo’s argument, stating that no large-scale electoral irregularities were observed and that, according to the UN’s Chief Observer “second tour was generally carried out in a democratic fashion” (New York Times, Jeune Afrique). As a result the international community has called on Gbagbo to allow the CEI to announce the provisional results immediately, echoing more forceful calls from Ouattara’s camp (rfi, Jeune Afrique)

In 2000, when Gen. Guei refused to budge, Gbagbo broke the impasse by putting his supporters in the streets and taking control of Abdijan. Could Ouattara do to Gbagbo what Gbagbo did to Guei? Ouattara has well organized youth supporters, but the youth that pushed Gbagbo to power in 2000 are still largely by his side (despite the economic malaise of Gbagbo’s tenure), organized after 10 years in power into the formidable “patriotic galaxy” of quasi-militia youth movements (ICG) . It is Gbagbo’s control of the streets of Abidjan that will allow him the time to stall the CEI and bring the decision to “his” Constitutional Council.


In early April a British subcontractor for the Malaysian oil company Petronas was killed during an ambush in Ethiopia's restive Somali region (BBC). Know as the Ogaden, this arid terrain has been the site of long-standing conflict between Somali separatist rebels and government troops, as well as more recent prospecting for oil and natural gas by foreign firms. While the Ethiopian government has steadfastly asserted that the assailants were "mere bandits" and that the killing "was not politically motivated", foreign aid officials in the region told Reuters that the attack did not seem to be the work of thieves. "They didn't seek to steal anything," one aid official said, "they simply opened fire with AK-47s and riddled the car" (Reuters ; BBC). The main rebel group in the region, the Ogaden National Liberation Front (ONLF), has blamed the attack on government-back militias (VOA). Although condemning this particular attack, the ONLF has threatened, kidnapped and killed foreign oil workers before (most notably in April 2007 when ONLF commandos stormed a heavily guarded Sinopec facility, killing nine Chinese workers and taking seven hostage), angered by Addis Ababa's attempts to milk their homeland of its natural resources (Reuters). While sorting out the true perpetrators will undoubtedly prove difficult, this event has demonstrated once again that foreign corporations operate in the Ogaden at great peril.

Eleven oil companies are currently prospecting for oil and natural gas in the Ogaden including Malaysia's Petronas, Canada's Africa Oil and Britain's Tullow The Ethiopian government has expressed its desire to offer 14 more licenses over the next three years.(Cakaara News; Addis Fortune). If the killing of a Petronas geologist is not enough to proove that the Ogaden environment is about to heat up for foreign multinationals, the ONLF's April 25 announcement of a new military offensive should certainly serve as proof enough. In an interview with Mogadishu's Shabelle Radio, the ONLF's information secretary warned foreign companies and aid agencies to stay away from Ethiopian troops, with whom the ONLF seek to engage (Shabelle Radio). However, in the wake of past attacks by the ONLF and other rebel groups, foreign company's facilities are heavily guarded by the Ethiopian military, making such requests impossible (Janes Defense Review). The ONLF, in a past warning issued in September 2009 recognized this Catch-22, and offered that the solution would be for oil companies to leave the Ogaden:
"the Ogaden is a war zone, so they should not conduct any business activity in it until there is a political solution to the conflict. The ONLF will not be responsible for any collateral damages that occur from its engagements with the Ethiopian army or security apparatuses (Ogaden National Liberation Front Statement September 15, 2009)."

The Ethiopian government has played down the ONLF's ability to mount serious attacks since an Ethiopian military crackdown which followed the ONLF's 2007 attack on a Sinopec facility. Since the operation, which lasted until the end of 2008, the government has characterized the rebel movement as a splintered remnant of its former self. Addis Ababa has brushed away grandiose communiqués from the ONLF describing successful campaigns in March and November of 2009 in which hundreds of Ethiopian soldiers were killed and several towns captured; instead the government has claimed only light skirmishes involving friendly militias and the ONLF in which most of the casualties lay on the rebel side (Jamestown Foundation ; BBC).

However according to an article in the April edition of Jane's Defense in Review the ONLF is gaining strength. Human Rights Watch descrided the Ethiopian military's campaign 2007-2008 campaign as one of collective punishment against the Ogadeni population, inlcuding the manipulation of food aid, and the rape torture and execution of civilians. These harsh tactics have increased the populace's support for the ONLF. A severe drought exacerbated the desperation of many Ogadenis shrinking the camel herds upon whihc they depend for survival. However this has freed up more young men for military service, as they no longer neeed to spend the dry season from December to March herding their families camels in search of water. According to an Ethiopian officer attached to a garrison in the Ogaden, a steady increase in the sophistication of ONLF attacks culminated in the November 2009 offensive in which the ONLF demonstrated its ability to move freely through-out the Ogaden and to target multiple fronts in a coordinated fashion. Indeed, other Ethiopian army informants told Jane's that the army's control is limited to large towns and roads during the daytime (Janes Defense Review April 2010).

In light of such information foreign oil companies operating in the Ogaden must take the ONLF's warning of an upcoming offensive as a serious threat. And even if the offensive does not amount to much, the killing of the Petronas subcontractor should give the oil companies pause - the potential for more seemingly random acts of violence in a region awash with weapons and mired in poverty seems high.

Photo: NY Times
Map: Somaliland Times

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